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With respect to distributive justice, controversies over the sufficiency of a conception of 
impartiality generally involve the problem of how a standard of rational justification 
ignores features, values, or attributes of individuals or groups placed under scrutiny. 
This problem of justification has often been referred to as the adoption of “monological” 
moral reasoning which, as Seyla Benhabib puts it, “proceeds from the standpoint of the 
rational person, defined in such a way that differences among concrete selves become 
quite irrelevant.”1 The stronger contention derived from this criticism is that a theory of 
impartiality is impossible since it must assume some rational principles which will 
inevitably exclude diverse others.2 
Amartya Sen offers a comparative account of impartiality in which difference and 
individual perspective are taken seriously. Throughout Sen’s analysis it is clear that he 
relies on epistemological criteria to justify certain procedures while discounting others, 
or what Elizabeth Anderson refers to as an “epistemological strategy for dealing with the 
multiplicity of evaluative perspectives.”3 At the same time, this account is, as Anderson 
notes, “pragmatic” with respect to finding resolution by removing the most agent-relative 
reasons through a process of critical scrutiny that employs trans-positional objectivity 
and an open impartial observer.4 (I will explain these concepts later.) However, while 
Sen makes the argument that his theory avoids any kind of monological reduction or 
universalization of rational principles, there is a problem concerning the role of socially 
 and historically determined normative values5 and how Sen expects that a process of 
critical scrutiny will weed out unreasonable values, claims, and principles in order to 
arrive at “shared reasons.”6 
Beyond his reference to normative concepts and diversity of influences gleaned 
from sociological analysis,7 there is a lacuna in which Sen leaves underdeveloped a 
treatment of ‘non-rational’ beliefs determining our behaviour and ethical reasoning. I use 
the word non-rational to reflect factors whose efficacy in shaping our ethical reasoning 
needs to be taken into account, yet in such a way that we should not expect these to 
conform to the remit of conventional standards of what it means to be rational or have 
adequate justification.8 Such beliefs are not irrational but, as I will argue, in large part 
constitute our human understanding since they are substantive ethical beliefs which we 
inherit by virtue of the historical and cultural transmission of knowledge, or those beliefs 
which are ‘prejudices’ according to the original, non-pejorative meaning of the word.9 
Following Paul Ricoeur, I will discuss these beliefs more specifically in terms of ‘ethical 
convictions’ (hereafter shortened to ‘convictions’). 
This strategy is by no means trivial. As I will show, there is more to the kinds of 
convictions of which Ricoeur speaks than meets the eye. They are not just beliefs that 
favor partiality or care towards oneself or a member of one’s group. Rather, they form 
part of the bedrock on an entire ethical order10 in which meanings and values are 
ascribed not only to others but to what is ultimately at stake in one’s existence—
eschatological, political, or otherwise. To be sure, philosophers often pay attention to 
such orders, particularly with reference to religious conflict (either with other religions or 
with secularism). However, part of what Ricoeur understands by the term ethical order, 
 and which I will explain in more detail later, is how convictions within an order are 
largely if not totally incommensurable with other orders.11 This does not mean that the 
one who holds convictions is incorrigibly stubborn. Rather, it is to suggest that the order 
in which one’s values emerge is largely untranslatable into another order, especially one 
which attempts to enact an impartial form of mediation. In this respect, it is worthwhile 
noting that much of the analytic literature discussing debates between impartiality and 
partiality tacitly assume that different discourses and languages respective to competing 
groups are to a large degree unproblematically inter-translatable.12 Or if the literature 
does not make this assumption, then clarification of meaning is seen to be one of the 
virtues and results of a process of public reasoning, coordination, or progression to 
more sufficient types of justice.13 So, bringing Sen and Ricoeur into dialogue with one 
another offers a way of introducing and rethinking “the fact of pluralism” not simply in 
terms of competing values, allegiances, or moral requirements but of recognizing how 
such conflicts involve convictions (and therefore ethical orders) that make translation 
significantly problematic. 
My thesis on Sen is that his theory of impartiality is incomplete insofar as he 
maintains that critical scrutiny from various points of view can sufficiently secure 
impartial judgement. Sen, I will argue, does not adequately develop a role for 
convictions, relying too heavily on the critical role of reason as a means of stemming 
and even correcting convictions. Can one accurately distil convictions into reasons 
given different cultural and historical traditions that inform the understandings of others? 
While this is a problem concerning the adequacy of Sen’s theoretical account, it 
has a significant practical implication. If convictions constitute a substantial foundation 
 for ethical reasoning, then shared reasons gained through a procedure of impartial 
mediation will not fully address or resolve the stronger motivations of an individual or 
group holding a conflicting view. In other words, one might agree to reasons, but this 
agreement may be superficial, even with the best intentions to attain consensus or 
reconciliation. As we will see, convictions are not readily revisable in view of shared 
reasons, and this is because they involve substantial commitments to an interpretation 
of how existence should be lived according to inherited ethical norms whose authority 
has been legitimated as a result of a group’s historically constituted identity. In many 
cases, especially in serious instances of cultural conflict, one is not merely faced with 
the task of finding shared reasons but reinterpreting centuries of a tradition of 
understanding and practices.14 
Ricoeur’s theory of impartiality, on the other hand, provides both a strong 
contrast to criticize Sen and an alternative to the resolution of conflicts within the 
domain of distributive justice. In short, there are two significant differences that should 
be noted. First, Ricoeur anchors impartiality not to a notion of objectivity but a 
willingness towards mutuality. He sees impartiality as a broad ethical concept that is 
defined, motivated, and justified by one’s own moral tradition. Impartiality, in other 
words, presupposes a normative commitment to be responsible towards and respectful 
of ‘an other.’ Second, Ricoeur maintains that prior to reasons are convictions. If the 
roots of convictions run deep in how we form and assess fair procedures for resolution, 
then we require a conception of impartiality that does not simply attempt to bracket them 
out. Instead, impartiality is possible only after the conflicting parties have understood 
each other’s convictions. This entails not looking for reasons upon which they can 
 agree, but making the attempt to become familiar with the history and cultural nuances 
of the other person’s tradition and, as mentioned earlier, ethical order. As we will see, 
the attempt to understand another’s ethical order differs from Sen’s appeal to positional 
objectivity. But for now it is necessary only to mark that Ricoeur’s approach offers a 
distinct advantage; namely, it does not attempt to redescribe convictions as that which 
are opposed to reason but instead as a major component of our rationalising process. 
This not only claims a more realistic account of conflict but, as importantly for Ricoeur, it 
places distributive justice within a project of mutuality as opposed to agreement. 
There is one qualification to note about my analysis of Ricoeur’s conception of 
impartiality. Ricoeur often speaks of impartiality in relation to corrective justice and legal 
systems. I therefore take some liberty in interpreting how impartiality relates to the 
distinct field of distributive justice. My claim is that this maneuver is not far-fetched if one 
bears in mind that while corrective and distributive justice both use impartiality to 
establish a “just distance” in which testimony can be heard, the latter is distinct in its 
search for mutual understanding.15 
This essay is divided into four sections: I will provide an analysis of I) Sen’s 
account of open impartiality and how it avoids the charge of universalization; II) how 
Sen’s theory remains incomplete when assuming that reasons are sufficient in 
mediating conflict; III) Ricoeur’s conception of conviction; and IV) Ricoeur’s theory of 
impartiality and how it involves the aim of mutuality. 
 
I. Recapitulating Sen 
 For Sen, distributive justice is in large part secured by open impartiality which is a 
participatory process that moves towards ‘better reasoning’ by exposing to critical 
scrutiny the rational principles which inform our commitments, choices, and value 
judgements.16 The decisive part of this process is how open impartiality involves the 
employment of a global dimension of evaluation where reasons derived from different 
perspectives can be tested for justification beyond the consideration of the groups and 
institutions immediately involved, or what Sen calls “focal groups.”17 Because Sen takes 
the role of different perspectives seriously, he is sceptical of theories of justice 
predicated on a conception of universality, that is, when a theory is founded on or 
presupposes a uniformity of principles upon which we can all agree. Sen is also critical 
of such theories insofar as he deems the role of universality as unnecessary and 
insufficient for a theory of justice.18 He argues instead that agreement does not arise by 
applying an ideal standard of rational justification or set of putative universal principles, 
but is achieved by virtue of the participants working out their disagreements and ideally 
finding reasons they can share.19 Anderson describes this as a “learning” process of 
reason that can help to achieve a “superior evaluative perspective.”20  
Sen is careful when explaining exactly how this alternative is theoretically and 
practically viable. I will summarize his account according to three stages: 1) positional 
objectivity; 2) trans-positional objectivity; and 3) open impartiality. 
First, Sen acknowledges that positionality is inescapable and significant in the 
formation of values and relations to things and others; an account of perspective needs 
to be included when attempting to understand the value judgements of a person. Sen 
uses the concept of positional objectivity to explain how objectivity is present in 
 individual perspective: What each perspective entails is a view of reality whose 
objectivity can be confirmed if “such an observation could be reproduced by others if 
placed in the same position.”21 Thus positional objectivity is “the objectivity of what can 
be observed from a specific position” by anyone.22 In this respect, Sen departs from the 
traditional epistemological notion of objectivity that does not require the inclusion of 
individual perspective in striving for interpersonal invariance. 
Second, because something can be viewed from many different perspectives, 
there is a need to include a variety of positionally objective perspectives. Sen observes 
that positional objectivity from several positions is therefore “not so much a ‘view from 
nowhere,’ but a ‘view of no one in particular’.”23 The collection of positionally objective 
views is what he refers to as a “trans-positional” form of assessment. “The constructed 
‘view from nowhere’ would then be based on synthesizing different views from distinct 
positions.”24 Trans-positional assessment forces a heavier justificatory burden on 
evaluation since we are asked to form a coherent view from the different positions. 
Third, Sen makes clear that trans-positionality does not refer to a viewpoint alien 
to the immediate context of focal groups. Because of this, there is a caveat to trans-
positional objectivity insofar as the various positions within a focal group can fall prey to 
“systematic illusions,” like the flatness of the earth, and “persistent misunderstandings,” 
like the inferiority of women.25 What can arise from these illusions is a sense of 
impartiality that is fair when it is actually limited by agent-relative beliefs or 
misinformation. Sen refers to this as a “closed” impartiality which has three traits: 
“Procedural parochialism” (shared prejudices of the focal group), “Inclusionary 
incoherence” (exclusion of others by the criterion of the internal consistency of focal 
 beliefs), and “Exclusionary neglect” (neglect of others outside the focal group and 
affected by decisions).26 So what becomes prudent for Sen is to include an open and 
impartial perspective alien to the trans-positional group. 
Sen’s claim is that open impartiality facilitates the process by which the reasons 
of competing parties can be rationally scrutinised and the process of fairness can be 
optimised.27 Through an open, impartial observer values can be compared and 
assessed in order to identify unreasonable biases lurking under the veil of positional 
and trans-positional objectivity.28 Sen’s comparative theory attempts to secure 
objectivity by placing the claims in question in dialogue with an observer outside the 
immediate debate.29 As a whole, this process forces a comparative form of assessment 
whose aim is the distillation of general reasons to produce impartial reasons, or “what 
others cannot reasonably reject.”30 Moreover, this comparative process is not simply 
formal in the sense that it provides steps to be taken; rather, it is the instantiation of 
reason itself since in illuminating impartial reasons, it requires of us to explain such 
reasons in a way that others can follow. 
While Sen’s theory admits some features of universalized conceptions of 
impartiality that rely on the ability “to represent the theoretically relevant interests of all 
involved persons,”31 he refrains from the temptation of universal truth claims and the 
traps of stringent epistemic and cognitive requisites by reducing the remit of impartial 
assessments to specific situations. The role of impartiality is, above all, only situationally 
directed; what arises from the mediation by impartiality is never anything like the result 
of submitting one’s maxim to the test of the rule of universalization.32 Instead, 
differences hope to be settled by consensus; and this conclusion in itself means very 
 little to the establishment of universal values and precepts for the whole of the global 
community.33 Impartiality exposes the sufficiency of reasons which at best become 
shared reasons amongst diverse groups with respect to a specific conflict34 and 
therefore is concerned with “actual freedoms,” that is, the freedom an individual has in 
order to pursue his or her ends and the capability to achieve those ends.35 
Having said this, is there still a way to reassert the charge of universalism against 
Sen? One might allege that despite the inclusion of the third, impartial observer, 
procedures of reasoned scrutiny cannot but help impose some standard of justification 
that would misrepresent one of the parties’ beliefs. A reply to this charge lies in showing 
its unreasonableness. The danger of arguing from a robust notion of pluralism, or an 
ideology of difference, is that it forces a continual retreat from resolute judgement by 
forever protecting individual identity against others. As a proponent of much of Sen’s 
philosophy, Anderson has clarified how theories critical of impartiality misunderstand the 
pragmatics of public debate if they think preservation of individual identity is the most 
significant aim. Ricoeur shares this criticism when noting how “[t]he paradox is indeed 
that the praise of difference ends up reinforcing the internal identities of the groups 
themselves.”36 Anderson concludes that what is of most importance is that individual 
claims are not seeking “validation of their parochial positionality as particular, but to 
offer up their perspective as universal, as properly shared by all.”37 It is the supposition 
of universality which lends itself to genuine debate. But while assuming universality to 
be an integral motivation for debate, Sen’s situationally based, comparative approach 
does not assume that a process of debate will reach the establishment of universal 
principles. In any situation concerning conflict over reasons, one need only attend to the 
 debate at hand without concern for an overarching doctrine of what constitutes justice or 
reason.38 Commitments to open impartiality, as long as they are identified by each 
party, enable a particular debate to follow the process of scrutiny more successfully and 
therefore articulate and represent respective identities. 
Nevertheless, one can still persist in criticising Sen’s approach. While practical, 
Sen’s attempt to mute universal claims through a comparative approach leave the role 
of convictions unaddressed. Even if the comparative process is not interested in 
establishing universals, the people engaged in debate often are, or at the very least, 
see any substance of their claims as correlative to their universality. The problem with 
Sen is not the marginalization of diverse identities, but rather, his assumption that 
shared reasons are adequate for providing understanding in situations of conflict. 
 
II. Incompleteness of Sen’s Account 
The critical reading of open impartiality that I will be providing in this section relates to 
Sen’s account of rational debate as the process by which the diversity of values 
informing a person’s rationality can be translated into reasons through the use of critical 
scrutiny in public, reasoned debate. While his efforts have transformed the way in which 
economics approaches rational behaviour, my intent is to push his account further by 
maintaining that given the diversity of normative values, some of these values are not 
easily or readily translated into reasons that would have a wide public acceptability. 
Indeed, in cases where there tends to be a significant level of disagreement, the 
problem of understanding the meaning of unfamiliar concepts and practices appears the 
fundamental obstacle.39 
 In his critical analyses of maximizing behaviour,40 Sen acknowledges the 
legitimacy of normative values as influences on volitional choice-making. He rightly 
broadens a conception of rationality and how rational agents may be acting from 
convictions, precepts, or principles beyond self-interest or utility maximization. Sen 
therefore leaves the category of “normative” broad since he is content to accept it as 
something which is, despite whatever specific content it may have, complex and 
therefore not easily decipherable. He argues that it is the task of evaluative theory 
employed by economists to recognize the variety of normative values and be able to 
accommodate them in their explanatory and predictive models.41 For instance, looking 
at the theory of “revealed preference” in economics, where a preference is presumed 
from a choice taken by an agent,42 Sen refers to the complexion of normative influences 
under the term “social”: 
 
[M]an is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own 
preferences only. . . . An act of choice for this social animal is, in a 
fundamental sense, always a social act. He may be only dimly aware of 
the immense problems of interdependence [of “different people’s 
choices”] that characterize a society. . . [b]ut his behaviour is something 
more than a mere translation of his personal preferences.43 
 
“Social” in one sense can be defined as the relations and practices that generate what 
one believes to be ethical precepts consistent with the group with which one identifies.44 
 Indeed, an agent’s choice does not always reveal his or her preference, and there may 
be other normative commitments involved. 
In order to make his account more accommodating to the mire of competing 
normative claims, Sen relaxes some of the criteria traditionally seen to constitute 
rationality—such as internal consistency and completeness of rankings. In addition, he 
acknowledges that the interpretation of language is a perpetual obstacle; this includes 
not only languages foreign or unfamiliar to a focal group but also, as Sen points out, 
diverse “language games” in which even the same language can involve different 
meanings, connotations and especially “social elements” which serve to create an 
impasse to communication.45 
Nonetheless, despite these concessions, there is an assumption in Sen’s 
argument that in the arena of debate, normative values and claims can be translated 
into reasons that are more or less accurate in representing and justifying others’ points 
of view. He refers to this at one point as 
 
the extensive use we make of rationality in understanding what others are 
doing and why, and also what they know, what we can learn from what 
they know, and so on.46 
 
As Sen explains, this process is “foundationally connected with bringing our choices into 
conformity with critical investigation of the reasons for that choice.”47 My contention is 
that he takes an overly pragmatic view to the resolution of conflicts. Instead of persisting 
with the uniqueness of discourses and language games, Sen maintains that the process 
 of reasoned debate requires conflicting parties to express their “non-conformist 
proposals” through “conformist rules.”48 This assumes that an articulation of beliefs 
according to existing rules is not significantly problematic.49 But there are at least two 
reasons as to why we should think otherwise. First, conformist rules and the concepts 
employed by these rules are taken to be adequate in representing a person’s point of 
view and the tradition to which he or she attaches meaning. Second, Sen assumes that 
people involved in reasoned debate understand the rules and concepts presented to 
them and the authority the rules have in governing the debate. As we will see later, for 
Ricoeur the project of translation ought to include the attempt to understand an ethical 
order from within its own system and concepts. This provides not only a more sufficient 
means of understanding the claims of another, but it can also provide a critical function 
for an existing institution or focal group by contrasting a convention with what would be 
normally viewed as unfamiliar or even prohibited.50 Sen’s approach assumes that this 
critical function can still retain its integrity when another’s claims are translated by 
“conformist rules.”51 
A concrete instance of the problem of translatability, and one relating directly to 
claims of distributive justice, is the conceptualization of land as an economic factor of 
production. Especially, since the marginal revolution of the 1870s, it is now 
commonplace to assume land is not a distinct factor of production; it is either 
subsumable under labor (as with Marx) or capital (as Pareto declared).52 The loss of this 
classical distinction arguably endorses a legal conception of landownership that allows 
land to be exclusive, private property since it is not seen as something ontologically 
distinct and therefore requiring special treatment or definition. For example, opposed to 
 the idea of exclusive, private property in land is the notion of possession of land by 
usufruct—that is to say, one retains legal possession of land only insofar as he or she is 
using it for production or to live. There are, of course, many reasons one can cite in 
favor of and against usufruct. Such debates originated with the classical economists 
(i.e., Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo) and continue to this day with respect to a neutral 
land value tax.53 My point here is that despite the wealth of reasons for possession of 
land by usufruct, there may be underlying normative values that act as substantive 
meanings for why someone might insist that there can be no such thing as exclusive, 
private property in land. Native North Americans, the True Levellers, and supporters of 
Henry George share this idea but have, nonetheless, different ethical orders 
underwriting their convictions.54 Is it enough in these instances to rely merely upon 
reasons in conformity to existing rules of a focal group? 
It seems difficult to say “yes.” By digging deeper into meanings, values, and 
concepts, one begins to understand more fully how and why a position is taken, and 
what may in fact result is a view through which the predominant focal group’s practices 
can be revised.55 To see the expediency and sufficiency of a land value tax that is often 
paired with usufruct, in other words, is not the same thing as seeing why exclusive 
claims to land are ethically prohibited. To allow this misunderstanding to persist is not 
only to misunderstand the distinctness of ethical goods versus economic ones, but also 
to ignore the kind of practices and ends that inform one type of goods compared to the 
other. To maintain the distinction in choosing ethical goods, on the other hand, allows 
the ethical force of something like a land value tax policy to be apprehended as a form 
of ethical practice (and not simply a value-neutral or even optimal policy). Moreover, it 
 helps one make sense of our own historical traditions—i.e., the classical period of 
political economy, where one finds other ethical norms underwriting, for example, Adam 
Smith’s decision to uphold landownership despite the just nature of a land tax.56 
Returning to issues concerning rules of debate and translatability, there is the 
problem of Sen’s conception of rational discussion which seems to ignore contingent 
features involved in the endeavour to achieve successful communication. In procedures 
of debate where convictions are no longer legitimate and where the only things 
admissible are reasons, actors within a debate can tend towards a compromise of their 
own beliefs in view of a possible remedy to a conflict. This often happens in everyday 
circumstances where one person will translate another person’s thoughts (“Is what you 
mean this . . . ?”). The other person often consents in the interest of moving the 
discussion forward, not realising until later that the terms have shifted the focus and 
potential outcomes of the debate. Such shifts, as Hagi Kenaan points out, create distinct 
standards of successful reasoning in communication, standards which exclude a 
“middle ground” where meaning is only inchoately understood because it is difficult to 
articulate in another way.57 It seems likely that Sen can only view the establishment of 
such standards as a process of moving towards better reasoning.  
In view of these contentions, it is questionable whether Sen accounts for “other 
people” sufficiently. Indeed, he mentions only how rational agents need to take into 
account other people beyond the narrow description of agency as self-maximizing.58 
Within Sen’s development of “commitment,” relation to others, even if altruistic, is a 
relation to their welfare and not necessarily their beliefs. This formulation is overly 
narrow since it does not require an adequate understanding of another.59 So while Sen 
 may be sympathetic to identifying normative values when theorizing about them, I think 
there is a pressure on him to do more. Reasons, in other words, only scratch the 
surface of what is happening in conflicts of distributive justice. 
 
III. Ricoeur on Convictions 
Ricoeur develops his account of convictions according to an epistemological distinction 
he finds not only more realistic in view of everyday conflicts but productive when 
understood in a broader framework. Because theories about argumentation like Sen’s 
often focus on separating forms of “bad reasoning” from forms of “better reasoning,” 
there is a correlative tendency to view beliefs like convictions as those things which 
need to be discarded if they lack a certain standard of justification. When understood as 
beliefs lacking reasoned self-scrutiny, convictions occupy the place of parochial 
reasoning that Sen describes. Contrary to this, Ricoeur insists that convictions express 
a form of commitment to values and meanings whose normative content has authority 
for a focal group yet remains to be worked out and justified practically, that is, according 
to emergent situations of conflict. Convictions, as he will say, are therefore always 
“considered convictions,”60 that is, beliefs that express a universal claim but are 
inchoately justified because they have yet to be applied and worked out according to 
real situations. 
For Ricoeur there is no epistemological foundation for convictions if what is 
meant by foundation is a self-secured and certain beginning. Convictions are ethical 
beliefs that arise from within the context of an already existing ethical order or system of 
values.61 As he qualifies, convictions are not ‘beliefs that’ but ‘beliefs in’; exactly that to 
 which the ‘in’ refers involves already existing values one has inherited through history 
and tradition.62 So, in this respect, one has a belief in one’s capacity to make decisions 
by virtue of an existing order of ethical values. As ‘convicted,’ I am convinced a decision 
made is ‘good’ according to the context of my ethical values. Convictions are truly 
normative in the sense that they are possible only because an ethical order provides a 
“totality of signification” in which one can distinguish between good and bad actions.63 
Ricoeur, like Alasdair MacIntyre, describes this feature of knowing and decision-making 
in terms of order, that is, an order of some kind that precedes each of us and is often 
recognizable as a tradition of practices and shared understanding: 
 
The term “order” conceals the greatest difficulty for ethico-juridical 
philosophy, namely, the status of the authority attached to this [. . .] 
order, that which even makes it an order.64 
 
We recognize ethical orders according to the way in which we recognize what has 
authority over our decision-making. Thus, to reason one’s way to a judgement about a 
choice requires the values, given by and accepted on authority, in order to delineate a 
good choice from a bad one. Ricoeur’s fundamental point is to show that within the 
ethical domain, our reasons for acting in one way and not another are not reasons in the 
fully choate form of being justified. Rather, they are convictions that arise from within an 
ethical order which we are then brought to justify in situations of conflict. 
In other words, convictions act as criteria for what an agent believes to be the 
basis for a prudent choice. These criteria are not identical to justifications: In situations 
 of moral conflict, rational agents make decisions concerning how to act as if they were 
anticipating a requirement of justification. Criteria can then be employed in the task of 
justifying an action should the agent be held accountable by someone else, an 
institution, or even the agent him- or herself. The criteria provided by an ethical order 
enable an agent to believe (to be convinced) that what he or she is doing is good, right, 
or prudent. But the move from relying on criteria for justification presupposes the 
language in which justificatory statements are made is either unproblematic or 
transparent in meaning. And this, as we will see in the final section, is precisely that with 
which Ricoeur takes issue. But for now, let us note how Ricoeur emphasizes that 
convictions are beliefs that enable one to act (“I can”), whereas Sen holds a weaker 
standard for responsible agency insofar as we need only make causal connections 
between our choices and possible outcomes.65 And this standard is perhaps 
presupposed by his assumption that shared reasons can be rather easily and practically 
ascertained. 
Nonetheless, a critic of Ricoeur might argue that the relation of convictions to 
justification is viciously circular, epistemologically and ideologically. If we do not appeal 
to anything beyond convictions, whatever we argue will simply presuppose those 
convictions. Ricoeur’s counter is that any circularity between convictions and 
justification entails a process of critical revision wherein the demand for justification 
becomes a way of revising one’s convictions from within his or her ethical order. 
Epistemologically speaking, Ricoeur understands ethical reasoning as a 
reasoning “aware of its own lack of foundation”66 and therefore seeking to justify actions 
through a process of argumentation within one’s own tradition. Because convictions lack 
 certainty (e.g., I am convinced of something but not certain of it), their validation arises 
through argumentation with others who do not agree. Such challenges put an ethical 
order under strain to respond reflectively. Similar to MacIntyre’s notion of internal 
revision of a tradition through rival conflict, Ricoeur emphasizes that any revision is not 
one in which another order imposes itself. Rather, external pressure allows for a 
refiguration of existing beliefs and values.67 Furthermore, Ricoeur grants that this 
process of argumentation articulates universal claims with the caveat that no 
justification can ever completely secure a claim’s universality. So while “No moral 
conviction would have any force if it did not make a claim to universality,” at the same 
time for Ricoeur, a conviction is “an alleged or inchoative universal seeking 
recognition.”68 The process of seeking recognition is a process of validation through 
argumentation whose conclusion attests to a universal principle of some kind that itself 
is subject to further validation according to new situations that arise, or what is a 
process of verification throughout one’s whole life.69 Ricoeur thus sees the paradigmatic 
model of argument and validation as being “the juridical procedures of legal 
interpretation” which always hold in view a law in relation to a specific context.70 It is 
worth recalling that Sen sees public debate as a practical, comparative remedy without 
universal implications. Ricoeur, alternatively, reads the tension between universal 
claims and historical/situational conflict as a dialectical structure through which universal 
claims can gain more coherency, especially through their revision.71 
In terms of social praxis and the critique of ideology, Ricoeur does not see the 
circular relation between convictions and justification as a form of domination as does, 
for example, Pierre Bourdieu when analyzing the relation between habitus and modes 
 of production.72 Rather, for Ricoeur, because ethical reasoning is often faced with 
conflicts in specific situations, it forces the reasoning of focal groups to reassess their 
own assumptions and customs. There is no guarantee that this self-critical scrutiny will 
emerge; and critics may charge that a conception of ethical reasoning which does not 
more strongly force self-scrutiny is to a large degree inadequate. However, Ricoeur 
insists that genuine argumentation in the arena of distributive justice and ethics requires 
an appropriate hospitableness which cannot be forced. He refers to this as an inchoate 
mutuality in which parties are willing to receive each other. At the same time, he is not 
saying that procedures of justice which require debate and arbitration should be 
expunged, only that while such procedures may be in place and enforced, they cannot 
guarantee genuine debate since this requires both parties to be willing to recognize and 
respect each other.73 
Ricoeur refers to this generally as a “linguistic hospitality,” noting that the conflicts 
of distributive justice usually involve conflict at the level of diverse languages; even 
when parties speak the same language, as Sen too recognizes, different conceptual 
connotations, customs, and normative meanings can be hidden. Thus, the normativity of 
different languages requires a translation process between parties. However, unlike 
Sen, Ricoeur emphasizes the notion of hospitality: Translation between parties is not 
possible unless a certain amount of charity is granted to the other as expressing a 
rational and coherent view, which includes and does not omit their convictions: 
 
This phenomenon of linguistic hospitality can serve as a model for all 
instances of understanding in which the absence of what we might call a 
 third-person overview brings into play the same operations of transference 
and of welcome whose model can be found in the act of translation.74 
 
When referring to the “third-person overview,” Ricoeur is not suggesting like Sen that a 
third impartial observer would help to remedy conflict. Rather, he is suggesting here that 
its absence is a fact; a third-person overview is not possible because for the third 
person to be entirely impartial, a neutral metalanguage would be required to translate 
the points of view of both sides equitably. Elsewhere Ricoeur comments, 
 
The path of eventual consensus can emerge only from mutual recognition 
on the level of acceptability, that is, by admitting a possible truth, admitting 
proposals of meaning that are at first foreign to us.75 
 
In short, it is the distance in communication separating individuals and groups that 
provides for a genuine mutuality; genuine because communication must be ‘won’ 
through understanding a position foreign to one’s own. It is the role of impartiality, as we 
will see, to ensure this distance is productive. 
It is true that Ricoeur places a great deal of trust in an individual’s capacity to 
admit another according to a linguistic hospitality, but because convictions are 
themselves never certain forms of knowing, they should be understood to involve a 
mode of communication which does not stake itself upon a claim to finality. Ricoeur 
therefore speaks of this component of his theory of justice as an “act of confidence” in 
 our capacity to admit the other person into debate, without which claims to social 
cooperation and flourishing would be empty or an act of bad faith.76 
 
IV. Ricoeur on Impartiality 
So far, I have presented Ricoeur’s account of convictions as that which positively and 
substantially underwrites a group’s claims within the domain of distributive justice. But, 
then, does not the normative and therefore prejudicial nature of convictions make 
impartiality impossible? In this final section, I will discuss how Ricoeur is able to retain 
impartiality despite the prevalence he gives to convictions and, moreover, that his 
account of impartiality is more convincing than Sen’s. Seeing how Ricoeur links 
convictions to impartial judgement requires a significant shift in assuming what 
impartiality is. On Sen’s account, impartiality provides an objective standpoint built on 
shared reasons. But for Ricoeur, since objectivity is impossible, impartiality is more 
accurately an inter-subjective standpoint potentially providing a “shared 
understanding.”77 Where Sen wants a viewpoint “from nowhere in particular,” Ricoeur 
desires a more hospitable engagement. 
To see the contrast between the two in more detail, let us begin with a point on 
which they agree: Impartiality requires the ability of one group to place itself in the 
other’s position. Recall that for Sen, occupying the position of another has as its aim the 
delineation of objective reasons that anyone occupying that position cannot reject. For 
Ricoeur, however, the role of placing oneself in another’s position presupposes some 
degree of a mutuality of understanding. How can one genuinely attempt to occupy 
another’s position without admitting in some way the convictions of this other person? 
 Finding reasons cannot do this work since there are often concepts foreign to one’s 
perspective that cannot be easily distilled into reasons that can be shared. Indeed, 
Ricoeur’s distrust of shared reasons stems largely from his understanding of the 
complexity of religious traditions and the distinct and separate discourses—or language 
games—they involve.78 
But if the turn to objectivity is not possible, and if Ricoeur wishes to retain 
impartiality as a fundamental feature of debate, he has but one viable option: He 
maintains that a conception of impartiality is itself normative. In other words, the need to 
engage with another impartially is itself an ethical good esteemed within one’s own 
ethical order. But this claim is not simply a reduction of impartiality to a normative 
framework. Ricoeur’s strategy is to show how the normative framework enables one to 
transcend parochial limitations by virtue of the burden placed on oneself by the demand 
for impartiality articulated in one’s ethical order. The ethical demand to be impartial is 
exceptionally other-regarding.79 As we will see below, as such it often identifies 
exceptions to the norm according to which convictions can be revised. Ricoeur 
summarises this exceptional nature as “the concept of impartiality” placed at “the 
summit of the ethical life.”80 
Ricoeur observes that impartiality is possible because one can impute oneself as 
responsible for being impartial. To impute oneself—that is, to take account of oneself—
involves a self-reflexivity presupposed by the demand to be impartial. Without “the 
capacity of a subject to designate itself, himself, or herself as the actual author of its, 
his, or her own acts,” that is, “the capacity to posit oneself as an agent,”81 one would 
lack the ability to recognize those situations of conflict in which one ought to strive for 
 impartiality. Indeed, without this capacity, Sen’s explanatory account of the causal 
connection between a choice and its consequence does not seem sufficient unless it 
can be shown that this type of causal connection is innately and substantially other-
regarding, and not simply concerned about the other’s welfare.82 Or at the very least, 
Sen would have to account for how different groups may express different beliefs for 
what it means to be impartial and how this fits with his notion of the kind of impartial 
judgement that should preside over these diverse beliefs in public debate. 
If there are many ways in which ethical orders determine how an action and its 
consequences can be evaluated under a conception of responsibility,83 then basic to 
these ways is imputability and how a self situated within his or her ethical order is held 
accountable according to what is esteemed or valued in terms of good and bad actions. 
By virtue of an ethical order, one sees oneself as imputable according to these 
standards. “[E]thico-moral predicates,” as Ricoeur says, 
 
allow us to judge and evaluate the actions considered good or bad, 
permitted or prohibited. When these predicates are applied reflexively to 
the agents themselves, these agents are said to be capable of 
imputation.84 
 
Because imputability is self-reflexive in view of ethical concerns, it designates one of the 
highest forms of “self-reference” through which events and actions come under 
consideration and deliberation.85 This has the more local effect of integrating oneself 
 within one’s community since it allows one to be placed under the aegis of the authority 
of the community’s ethical order. Ricoeur writes, 
 
To be capable of entering into a[n] [. . .] order is to be capable of entering 
into an order of recognition, of inscribing oneself in a “we” that distributes 




Practices . . . are cooperative activities whose constitutive rules are 
established socially; the standards of excellence that correspond to them 
on the level of this or that practice originate much further back than the 
solitary practitioner.87 
 
And because ethical actions by their very nature affect others, there is a demand placed 
on self-imputation to recognize the ethical standing of others beyond one’s 
community.88 
More globally, then, the self-reflexive nature of imputation allows one to extend 
one’s ethical gaze towards difference. But this, of course, is not guaranteed. Ricoeur 
therefore emphasizes the deliberative aspect of ethical decision making (phronesis). He 
adds that imputation allows an individual’s sense of care for the other to be articulated 
as the “internalized voice” of practical deliberation which draws upon the resources of 
an ethical order when attempting to choose well in view of others. “[T]he search for the 
 choice appropriate to the situation,” he comments, “is to recognize oneself as being 
enjoined to live well with and for others.”89 It is in deliberation that the voice of authority 
ascribed to one’s ethical order is internalized in terms of one’s own thought. The given 
authority is scrutinized through one’s deliberation in a given situation of conflict. Indeed, 
to the voice of authority, the internalized voice of deliberation can present the exception 
to the rule. 
Given the important role of imputation, the normative significance of impartiality 
can be expressed in more detail: In situations calling for impartiality, one’s self-
imputation as the deliberator who should be impartial involves the recognition that the 
others concerned are esteemed by oneself as being worthy of impartial judgement. 
Impartiality must be won through deliberation, or what Ricoeur describes as the “heroic” 
and “moral effort” to accommodate the other “against the backdrop of a shared 
understanding.”90  
With this recovery of impartiality through the normative framework, Ricoeur 
subsequently redescribes the kind of distance that impartial judgement is supposed to 
provide. While conventionally we tend to view this distance in terms of neutrality or 
objectivity, Ricoeur frames it in terms of a “just distance” that allows for communication. 
Or if we wish to play with the meaning of the word “distance,” one can say that the 
estimation of worthiness of the other involved in impartiality allows the initial distance in 
communication to become a “just distance” where convictions can be expressed. 
Because the other is worthy of impartial judgement, his or her case can be heard.  
Ricoeur’s account clearly moves beyond the aim of shared reasons since it asks 
conflicting parties to enter and understand a rival tradition with which they are engaged. 
 It may be true that many instances of debate in the realm of distributive justice may not 
require this depth of engagement, but it is also true that some of the most problematic 
conflicts involve discussion in which both parties assume a sameness, identity, or 
simple commensurability between the languages through which each party articulates 
their view. Ricoeur, in this respect, uses tragic situations as the barometer for his 
theory, insisting that tragic situations of conflict require this deep level of engagement 
and that therefore a theory of justice should look towards its most volatile and 
problematic instances in offering a possible process of fair resolution.91  
To be sure, a thorough account of what Ricoeur sees entailed in shared 
understanding would require an analysis of his account of mutual recognition and 
perhaps his discussion of memory and forgiveness.92 But with respect to the aim of this 
article, it is sufficient to refer to two examples that demonstrate how a shared 
understanding requires a thorough immersion in that person’s order and system of 
thinking. 
First example: Though not an instance of a direct conflict between ethical orders 
and individuals (but an indirect one at the level of economic goods), the philosopher and 
economist Philip Mirowski has pointed out with respect to economic theory that the 
metaphors it uses to explain and represent its subject of analysis determine the way in 
which its various research programs will envisage and represent disciplinary limitations 
and aims—most notably for Mirowski are the metaphors used to explain physical 
conservation principles (e.g., substance and field theories).93 Gaining perspective on 
this phenomenon requires entering into systematic concepts and structures in order to 
understand what may have constituted something like a break or shift in theoretical 
 assumptions—e.g., why something like “equilibrium” can be deemed a good when it is a 
practical fiction. Such questions arise because some metaphors and concepts no longer 
work when attempting to explain economic phenomena. Understanding why this is so 
involves, on Mirowski’s account, not just offering an alternative theory or assessing 
reasons but seeing how the problem arose through a historical development of thought. 
So one is asked to immerse oneself in an unfamiliar historical situation (or what is 
essentially the “other”) in which such metaphors and concepts were posited.94 This 
approach can be said to result in a shared understanding because the inquirer has 
entered into a specific theoretical system in order to view its commitments and 
reasoning ‘as if’ in the first person. It does not entertain a simple notion of historical 
progress but one in which understanding the present and future requires engaging with 
the past, and indeed becoming aware of how a present view may be dominated by 
different metaphors. 
Second example: MacIntyre has provided a formulation of the ways in which 
traditions can break out beyond parochial confines through a nuanced process of 
debate. It involves more than a simple consideration of compelling reasons offered from 
other “rival traditions” because each tradition must find a way to accommodate 
challenges by internally revising its current structures, practices, and concepts.95 Like 
Ricoeur, MacIntyre sees the translation and interpretation of traditional historical texts 
as central to the project of a tradition’s revivification and ability to address changing 
historical circumstances. One of MacIntyre’s more convincing instances with reference 
to moral traditions in philosophy concerns the comparison of the various attempts to 
translate the episode of Achilles’ rage in The Iliad (I.189–192) where Achilles is 
 conflicted when having to choose whether or not to strike down Agamemnon. MacIntyre 
points out that various translators use their own moral precepts to make sense of the 
conflict—i.e., between “rival thoughts” (George Chapman, 1598), “reason and passion” 
(Alexander Pope, 1715), and “alternating impulses of passion” (Robert Fitzgerald, 
1974).96 For MacIntyre, this heterogeneity of translations produces a productive rivalry 
between moral traditions that ideally enables one to reinterpret ethical precepts by virtue 
of confronting outside challenges. This is not to forget, as mentioned earlier, that the 
adherents to a tradition must be willing to do so. 
In both the works of Mirowski and MacIntyre, one finds a deliberate and laborious 
engagement with the historical development of concepts and theories in order to offer a 
way of revising current methods of inquiry. They see this not as superfluous to an 
understanding of their respective fields but necessary.97 In this respect, their historical 
concerns are not really a foray into historical details and contexts as much as they are a 
way of understanding how our current predicaments and impasses have emerged. 
These two examples, I am saying, help us to better envisage what may be required of 
shared understanding when engaging in public debate, especially since convictions, as 
shown earlier, are historically constituted. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The starting point of this article was the question concerning whether or not shared 
reasons are enough when conceiving the aim of impartiality. Sen’s practical, 
comparative approach avers that such reasons can be discovered through a process of 
public, reasoned debate and the inclusion of an external impartial observer. My 
 challenge to this thesis was staked on Ricoeur’s analysis of convictions and how they 
run deeper than their correlative reasons or justifications may indicate. Simply 
countering one reason with another, more sufficient one in the process of debate does 
not address the ways in which convictions operate historically and culturally. A 
consensus of reasons, or shared reasons, is therefore not enough for a theory of 
distributive justice which aims to provide resolutions for conflicts. Instead, a more 
hospitable route that engages with another’s ethical order or tradition is required so that 
a competing party or external observer can understand the complexities by which 
specific beliefs are seen as authoritative. Ricoeur refers to this as a shared 
understanding, shared because one has attempted to occupy a first-person position 
within the unfamiliar tradition. The implication of this is that a strategy for practical 
resolution is more complex and laborious than we might otherwise hope. But a 
truncated, pragmatic alternative seems much more dangerous insofar as we might 
create an illusion by which we think that we can represent another’s convictions and 
ethical order by a meta- or neutral language. 
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